According to Émile Durkheim, one of the fathers of modern sociology, the main cohesive force of a society, or even of small communities, is the solidarity of the individuals who make them up. However, the nature or quality of solidarity can be quite different, especially in a wider society with many individuals and many different languages, cultures and more. While in a smaller community there is usually more common ground, and personal connections mean that pretty much everyone knows everyone else, the differences between individuals and the multiplicity of more impersonal connections in larger communities mean that cohesion-wise, the latter needs a little extra, as they say.
In the case of our societies, and human civilization as such, it is therefore crucial to take a closer look at what it is that can provide individuals with a sense of belonging. As already mentioned in the previous blog post, Durkheim identified collective consciousness as the source of this solidarity, which plays a fundamental role in the formation of our individual identity, which also determines our social belonging. Nevertheless, collective consciousness can also spring from two sources, which Durkheim referred to in his work only as mechanical and organic solidarity. But what do these two concepts mean, and what are the basic differences between them in terms of the organization and development of our communities and societies?
In Durkheim’s interpretation, mechanical solidarity is primarily characteristic of small communities of people with a homogeneous structure, meaning that their members have similar characteristics (common language, culture, religion, etc.). Accordingly, mechanical solidarity is the social integration of members of a community who share common values and beliefs. These shared values and beliefs are responsible for the formation of a ‘collective consciousness’ that emerge internally in each member to make them work together. Because, in Durkheim’s view, the forces causing members of society to cooperate were much like the internal energies causing the molecules to cohere in a solid, he drew upon the terminology of physical science in coining the term mechanical solidarity.
At the same time, the notion of mechanical solidarity can also be interpreted as a virtually automatic mechanism that is usually activated in people with shared values and beliefs, which can then provide increased cohesiveness between group members. In other words, common language, customs, beliefs, ideas and so on can lead people to act or cooperate together at a level that may even go beyond common characteristics or values. For example, it is often the case that members of a religious denomination not only worship together, but also organize other joint activities or help each other in other areas of life.
Organic solidarity, on the other hand, is a different level of social integration, which directly stems from what individuals can offer each other to promote each other’s well-being. In this case, members of broader or more differentiated communities are more or less conscious of what they and others in the group need, and build networks of mutual cooperation among themselves accordingly. In a society characterized by organic solidarity, there is relatively greater division of labor, with individuals functioning much like the interdependent but differentiated organs of a living body. Such a society relies less on imposing uniform rules on everyone and more on regulating the relations between different groups and persons, often through the greater use of contracts and laws.
It would seem from the above that mechanical solidarity forms a stronger link between people than organic solidarity. In a sense, this may be true, since mechanical solidarity is essentially the result of similarities, shared experiences and habits, which tend to make it easier and quicker for us to show solidarity with others. Although there is typically less interdependence in these communities, the relationships are primarily emotional, and stem from the need as a social being to be part of a community from which one expects recognition and appreciation, essentially a sense of emotional security. It is also closely linked to abstract notions such as the search for meaning in our lives, which can manifest itself, for example, in a very strong religious or national consciousness.
To a certain extent this is not necessarily an issue, but the problem is that mechanical solidarity mainly works on a strong emotional basis, which can often lead to irrational behavior and extremism at the level of communities, or even at the level of a larger society. It is no coincidence that sects that appear to be completely divorced from reality are created on similar grounds, but more generally, many other forms of emotion- and identity-based hostility, warfare and existential opportunism are also the result of the operation of mechanical solidarity. And, as I have pointed out in previous blog posts, this is also possible because politicians and other opportunists can manipulate large masses of people using mechanical solidarity as a tool.
But we do not necessarily need to think of extreme cases such as Adolf Hitler, who rallied a large part of the German public behind him with his ultranationalist speeches, because we can also experience the phenomenon in everyday situations such as the fanaticism often seen in sport. Indeed, many people are able to so blindly identify with a national team, a club, or even a single (star) athlete, that they regard all their rivals as virtual enemies, without even the slightest respect shown for them. This is, of course, mainly the case for less intellectual fans, who in football, for example, are simply referred to as ‘ultras’, but sometimes intelligent people can also easily be carried away by their emotions and the effects of ‘mass psychosis’. However, for those who persistently identify with their own favorite, blind adoration and exaggerated identification can override their own humanity in the formation of their identity, which may even lead to violence and all sorts of brutal acts against rivals or their supporters.
Yet the automatism of mechanical solidarity also works in less extreme cases, because most of us can easily identify with a person or group of persons who are practically unknown to us, – or at most we are familiar with them only through the media or other superficially formed images. If you think about it a bit more carefully and approach the issue rationally (assuming you are still able to move away from your prejudices, preconceptions and ‘social programming’), it may even seem strange why you prefer someone from your own nation, for example, over a foreigner who obviously has a different language or culture, but in some cases may not at all be less good, sympathetic, sportsmanlike, correct, etc. After all, you don’t know them personally, and apart from the obvious points of commonality, which are essentially due to chance (since no one can help where they are born), you actually have very little in common.
Of course, one always feels good when the object of one’s identification is successful, as you tend to see it almost as your own success, and it is a widely known fact that our thoughts and actions are largely influenced by our emotions. (Failure, on the other hand, we are much quicker to shrug off, preferring to blame others in favor of our own ego.) Such feelings can include a sense of national belonging, the shared enjoyment of sport or the arts, or, more generally, the understanding and solidarity of being in the company of like-minded people with similar views and interests.
While mechanical solidarity and its various manifestations can undoubtedly bring us many positives, we must not forget the negatives that can come with it. Because of its emotional influence and automatism, mechanical solidarity can insidiously turn masses of people against each other, while the lack of diversity within a community it defines can lead to too many ‘yes-men’, which can be a serious obstacle to progress. It is no coincidence that mechanical solidarity plays a dominant role in more backward and generally more authoritarian societies (see ‘third world’ countries, North Korea, etc.).
As organic solidarity typically manifests itself in a much more conscious – one might add, more democratic – form of belonging, such communities, which are usually much more differentiated, are much less defined by the above characteristics. Nevertheless, the conscious recognition of interdependence can give a group or a society an equally significant cohesive force, even if it does not provoke equally strong emotions – and therefore equally extreme reactions and behavior, either. On the other hand, it can provide us with results and breakthroughs that we would not have had the chance to achieve without conscious cooperation. One just needs to think of our settlements with public utilities, the production of the things we need to live, the availability of modern health services and education, our shared successes in science and space exploration, and much more.
That is why organic solidarity is essential for any diverse, highly developed and stable society, which can be considered much more civilized than the typically more primitive societies that are usually based on mechanical solidarity. And while it is undeniable that mechanical solidarity still has an important role to play in creating a sense of community, the above can serve as an excellent example of how it can be created and nurtured in practice in other, less harmful and uncontrolled ways. It is true that organic solidarity presupposes much more rationality and a different type of empathy, much less impulsive than that usually required for mechanical solidarity. In other words, the most important difference between these two forms of collective consciousness is the consciousness at the level of the individuals themselves, and therefore its growth is (or should be) in the basic interest of any society that wants to develop and considers itself civilized.
In our societies today, the cohesive force is usually provided by a mixture of mechanical and organic solidarity, but we must also see that it is not quite that simple. For the dominance of existential opportunism and the (neo)liberal market economy, in fact, elevate material goods and money above all else, so that it is unfortunately at least as much a dominant force as the much more desirable organic solidarity. But if the emphasis is on the former in our societies, we should not be surprised if many people look for happiness and fulfillment in the easy and quick, but subjective and often very harmful emotional content of mechanical solidarity in our atomized and dehumanized world.